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Abstract—Cooperative cloud providers in the form of cloud
federations can potentially reduce their energy costs by exploiting
electricity price fluctuations across different locations. In this
environment, on the one hand, the electricity price has a
significant influence on the federations formed, and, thus, on
the profit earned by the cloud providers, and on the other
hand, the cloud cooperation has an inevitable impact on the
performance of the smart grid. In this regard, the interaction
between independent cloud providers and the smart grid is
modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game interleaved with a
coalitional game in this paper. In this game, in the first stage
the smart grid, as a leader chooses a proper electricity pricing
mechanism to maximize its own profit. In the second stage, cloud
providers cooperatively manage their workload to minimize their
electricity costs. Given the dynamic of cloud providers in the
federation formation process, an optimization model based on a
constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) has been used by
the smart grid to achieve the optimal policy. Numerical results
show that the proposed solution yields around 28% and 29%
profit improvement on average for the smart grid, and the cloud
providers, respectively, compared to the noncooperative scheme.
Index Terms— Smart grid, demand response, cloud federation,
data center, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG), as the next generation of the power
grid, which is characterized by two-way communications, ad-
vanced control technologies, and modern energy management
techniques, enhances efficiency, sustainability, and reliability
of the electric energy [1], [2]. One key feature of the SG is
the so-called demand response (DR) model using which the
SG can design suitable incentives to induce dynamic demand
management of customers in response to grid conditions [3].
The utility companies can employ smart electricity pricing
such as time or location-dependent pricing policies as DR
programs to incentivize customers shift their load from peak
to off-peak times or from one physical location to another [4].
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Data centers (DCs) constitute a valuable target for DR due
to their substantial energy consumption [5]. Moreover, loads
of DCs are flexible that make them amenable to DR. DC
operators can shift their load from peak to off-peak time,
migrate their workload from one physical location to another,
or use the on-site generators and energy storage units. This
flexibility provides an important opportunity for the SG to
implement DR programs. Finally, the participation of DCs in
DR programs is beneficial not only for the SG but also for
the DC operators because it can reduce their electricity bill.
In this regard, cloud providers (CPs) have recently started
investigating new approaches to develop suitable workload
management mechanisms to increase their contributions in
DR programs as well as to minimize their costs [6]. One
promising solution for the power cost reduction of the cloud
providers is through cloud cooperation in the form of cloud
federations. A cloud federation is a set of individual CPs
agreeing to use their resources mutually and serve their users’
workload cooperatively [7]. Cloud federation enables the cloud
participants to reduce their electricity bills by using more
energy-efficient resources, accessing to more flexible energy
management strategies, or by employing the spatial variation
of the electricity prices over locations [8].
Particularly, when independent CPs cooperate with each
other and shift their workload toward other DCs, their electric-
ity demands change compared to the case of non-cooperation
scheme. This not only changes the electricity bills of CPs but
also has a major impact on the SG. In practice, the SG seeks to
balance supply and demand. In this regard, utility companies
should predict their customers’ demands and set electricity
prices dynamically to achieve their goals. Geographic load
distribution may lead to the changes in the power demands
and it can also incur extra cost to the SG due to over/under
loads if it is not considered by the SG [9]. Despite this
effect, the SG can utilize this opportunity by considering the
possibility of cloud cooperation through the right setting the
electricity prices for different power buses. Consequently, the
CPs should decide on how to form the federations to minimize
their electricity costs given the electricity prices.
There have been a significant amount of efforts on designing
effective programs to improve the participation of the DCs in
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DR (e.g., [10], [11]). However, most of these works addressed
the DR of one cloud provider and did not consider the interac-
tion of multiple CPs with the SG. On the other hand, several
contributions are focusing on the electricity bill reduction
of DCs through geographical migration of the workload by
forming the cloud federations (e.g. [7], [12]). However, these
works did not consider the CPs cooperation in the context
of demand response programs as well as the effect of this
cooperation on the SG performance.
Different from this prior literature, and regarding [9], which
expressed the cooperation among multiple providers, and
design of DR mechanisms for spatial-coupling loads, such as
data centers as two main issues which require more attention
from the research community, the main contribution of this
paper is modeling and analyzing a situation in which an SG
deals with independent CPs through a location-dependent DR
program. To this end, we aim to formulate the process of dy-
namic location-dependent electricity pricing by the SG along
with the cooperative workload management of independent
CPs. In particular, we consider an SG composed of multiple
power buses and some DCs and model their interactions. The
smart grid seeks to choose the set of prices to achieve an
optimal balance between maximizing its profit and performing
load balancing among power buses. Meanwhile, the CPs
will perform the demand side management by cooperatively
servicing the users’ workload by forming the federations to
minimize their electricity costs.
For this scenario, we develop a game-theoretic model to
jointly address the strategic decision of the SG for electricity
prices and the cooperative workload management of CPs in
response to the SG policies. This model is based on the
controlled coalition game framework introduced in [13]. It
is composed of a coalition formation scheme between the
cloud providers and an optimization formulation for the smart
grid. The proposed model is analogous to a nested two-
stage Stackelberg game, integrated with a coalition formation
game. The leading player in this game is the SG that chooses
electricity prices for each bus, in the first stage. In the second
stage, the CPs adapt their strategies (i.e. cooperative workload
management through coalition formation) after observing the
selected strategy by the smart grid. Our main contributions
can be summarized as follows.
• Cooperative cloud providers and smart grid interaction:
We formulate the interaction between a smart grid and
independent cloud providers who worked cooperatively in
the form of cloud federations in the context of a dynamic
electricity pricing scheme.
• Modeling and solution techniques: We model the problem
as a two-stage Stackelberg game, integrated with a coali-
tional game. We apply the coalitional game to analyze
the process of federation formation among CPs. Given
the dynamic of CPs, an optimization model based on
the constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) used
by the smart grid to find the optimal policy which is a
mapping from coalition states to the electricity pricing
policies.
• Simulation and results: We conduct simulations to show
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Numerical
results show that the SG can achieve the objective of
maximizing the revenue earned and minimizing the mis-
match between the power supply and demand, and the
energy cost of CPs reduces significantly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review related work. We introduce our system model
in Section III. Section IV gives the problem definition. In
Section V, we present our game model. Simulation studies are
presented in Section VI, and Section VII gives the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORKS
We discuss two classes of related works. The first category
addresses the DR of geo-distributed DCs. The second category
investigates techniques for exploiting cooperation among cloud
providers for energy cost reduction.
A. Geo-distributed Data Center Demand Response
Although significant recent studies have investigated the
problem of DC management in DR programs, only a handful
of works looked at the participation of geo-distributed DCs.
In this regard, the work in [14] and [15] designed an auction
mechanism to elicit the potential of the demand response from
a geo-distributed cloud. [16] proposed a price-sensitivity aware
geographical load balancing scheme for distributed Internet
data centers taking into account the dynamic characteristics
and actual physical constraints of the SG. The authors in
[17] focused on the energy cost and carbon emission of cloud
DCs equipped with renewable energies, and study the green
scheduling of them by energy trading with the SG.
DR of distributed DCs in the deregulated energy market
considering the uncertainties in the arrival rates of the work-
loads, local renewable generation, and time-varying electricity
prices is studied in [18] and [10]. In [19], authors studied
the pricing of bilateral electricity trade between a cloud
with geo-distributed hybrid DCs and the corresponding smart
grids. Moreover, in [20] and [21], authors formulated the
participation of geo-distributed DCs in a dynamic electricity
pricing program as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In these
prior works, the smart grid is modeled as a leader that performs
load balancing among power buses and maximizes its profit,
whereas the cloud provider as the follower seeks to maximize
its benefit. The authors in [22] studied the same problem
while taking into account the active decisions of both sides
and formulated the problem using bilevel programming. A
summary of the recent researches on the participation of geo-
distributed DCs in DR programs is shown in Table III.
In contrast to this prior art, we address the problem of
demand response of independent CPs, not a geo-distributed
cloud. In the case of geo-distributed DCs belonging to a cloud,
all DCs always collaborate with each other to maximize the
profit of the corresponding cloud. This assumption is not true
for independent CPs. As they are often selfish entities who
cooperate with each other only when it is beneficial for them.
Therefore, when dealing with the DR of multiple CPs, one
must investigate what stable coalitions are formed and how
the smart grid affects this collaboration.
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B. Energy Management of Cloud Federation
There is a significant number of works that addressed
the problem of federation formation among CPs for various
targets such as improving resource utilization or overcoming
the resource limitation (e.g. [23]–[26]). However, only a few
recent works focused on the federation formation for the
purpose of energy cost reduction [7], [12], [27], [28] as well
as energy sustainability [29].
Authors in [12] proposed an energy-aware resource and
revenue sharing mechanism and focused on minimizing the
overall energy of cloud providers. The work in [7] addressed
the problem of federation formation in order to reduce the CPs’
energy cost and devised an algorithm based on cooperative
game theory to allocate workload in an energy-aware fashion.
In [28], the authors proposed a framework for cooperative
virtual machine (VM) management of cloud users in a smart
grid environment. They designed an algorithm to allocate VM
of cloud users to the available resources and to manage the
DCs’ power consumption under various uncertainties.
The prior works in [7], [12], [27], [28] assumed that the
electricity prices are not affected by the CPs’ cooperation.
Consequently, they did not consider the impact of the cloud
federation on the smart grid as well as how the smart grid
takes its decision while taking into account the cooperative
workload management of the CPs. Unlike these studies, we
consider both the impact of the smart grid decision on the
cooperative VM allocation among the cloud providers and the
influence of the cloud providers’ cooperation on the smart grid.
Beyond these categories, [30], [31] and [32] are three
relevant studies which addressed DR of cooperative CPs. The
authors in [30] presented the aggregated participation of the
CPs in a smart grid’s power reduction program. The work in
[31] modeled the DCs electricity procurement process in the
wholesale electricity market. In this work, DCs aggregate their
loads to mitigate their power demand uncertainty in the mar-
ket. Leveraging the cooperative game theory, [32] proposed
a cloud federation formation algorithm in the presence of a
location-dependent DR program and analyzed the effect of
this cooperation on the SG performance. In contrast to the
works in [30] and [31], we consider the cooperative workload
management of geo-distributed cloud providers. Because of
the geographical distribution of CPs, they can take advantage
of the variety in the electricity prices to reduce their costs.
Besides, unlike these works which consider the aggregation
of CPs demands, in our work, VMs are migrated from one
CP toward the others to reduce the electricity bill. Compared
to [32] in which the SG is unaware of the CPs cooperation,
here, we consider the SG as an active agent in our game model,
takes strategic decision and model the interaction of the SG
with CPs along with the CPs cooperation. The related works
in this category are summarized in Table IV.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system that consists of multiple cloud
providers with geographically distributed data centers that in-
teract with a smart grid system. Each data center is connected
to a power bus to obtains its power. The smart grid operator
should denote, and consequently announce the price function
of each bus. Given pricing functions, each CP should specify
the amount of the electricity demand of its data center. The
power demand of each DC is denoted by the amount of the
workload that should be processed. Each cloud provider can
individually process its users’ requests or can cooperate with
the others if the cooperation leads to more benefits compared
to the noncooperative case. In the following, we describe our
system model with more details.
A. Smart Grid
We consider a discrete time model T = {1, .., T} in which
the length of each time slot t is determined according to the
time-scale at which the pricing decisions are updated (for
e.g. one hour). We consider a smart grid that encompasses
a set I of I power buses. The power buses are interconnected
through branches and form grid topology. Each power bus is
connected to various load devices. In our model, some buses
include data centers that provide cloud computing services
[20], [33]. In essence, we consider a set N of N distributed
DCs belonging to different cloud providers. Each data center
j is connected to one power bus in the smart grid to obtain its
required electricity [30]–[32]. As we are interested in demand
response of data centers, we focus on these loads and assume
that non-data center power demands are not elastic and the
smart grid can accurately predict their demands for the near
future [20], [33].
As the DR program, we consider a location-dependent
pricing scenario such as [22], [33], [34] for charging data
centers. In this regard, we define the electricity price function
θtj for DC j at time slot t as follows:
θtj = βj(e
t
j − δtj) + ztj , (1)
where etj represents the power consumption of data center j, δ
t
j
is the billing reference should be determined by the smart grid,
βj > 0 is a sensitivity parameter, and Ztj is the base electricity
price of the power bus j at time t. This dynamic pricing
scheme motivated by the tiered electricity pricing, which has
been widely implemented in many power markets.
To encourage the CPs to shift their electricity loads to less
loaded locations and prevent the SG from abusing its market
power, some constraints should be set to regulate the electricity
prices. In practice, the smart grid and cloud providers usually
negotiate with each other and enter into a contract to specify
the pricing structure. Based on related studies such as [22],
electricity prices should set in a specific range [θl, θh], where
θl and θh are lower and upper bounds, respectively.
B. Cloud Computing
In our system, each data center j ∈ N consists of a set
Mj of Mj hosts. For simplicity, we assume that all of the
hosts that belong to one of the DCs are homogeneous in terms
of processing capacity and provided the amount of memory
[34]. CPs provide their physical resources in the form of
virtual machine (VM) instances to customers. Each CP can
offer different VM classes which are different in terms of the
processing capacity as well as the available memory. Without
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loss of generality, we assume that all CPs offer the same VM
class.
A VM allocated on a physical host uses a certain fraction
of processing capacity and a specific amount of the memory.
Generally, each host has adequate resources for running more
than one VM at a specific time. Let aj be the total number
of VMs that can be served simultaneously by a single host of
DC j. In this regard, we define Qj as the processing capacity
of CP j, which is equal to Mjaj [7].
In a specific time slot, the amount of the workload of users
of CP j is represented by Wj , which is the set of VMs that
compose this workload. We denote the number of requested
VMs of CP j at time slot t by W tj . CP j can process this
workload either by using its hosts or by shifting it to the
DCs of other CPs. Additionally, each CP j defines a revenue
policy for charging its customers. In other words, CP j should
determine a per unit price for each VM class that customers
should pay. In this way, we define rj as the CPs charge for
processing each VM from class j [7].
C. Data Center Power Consumption
Here, our focus is on the energy used by hosts while
ignoring the energy consumption of the other facilities such as
cooling devices and unit power supplies. However, the power
consumption of these facilities is roughly proportional to the
host power [35] through the power usage efficiency (PUE).
PUE is defined as a ratio between the total power amount
used by the entire DC facility (consisting of hosts, cooling
devices, etc.) and the power consumption of IT equipment.
We model the host power consumption as P idlej +U(P
peak
j −
P idlej ) for any host j. Here, P
peak denotes the host power
when it is fully utilized, P idle represents the amount of power
consumption in an idle state, and U is the fraction of CPU
being used. In [36], the authors showed that this model, despite
the simplicity, provides an accurate estimate of the power
consumption for different host types. Hence, when mtj hosts
are active in time slot t, the average power consumption of
DC j can be calculated as follows [30]:
etj = m
t
j
[
P idlej +
(
P peakj − P idlej
)
U tj
]
γj , (2)
where U tj is the average CPU utilization level of hosts at DC
j, and γj is its PUE. This parameter usually has a value in
the range of [1.1, 3]. A smaller value indicates a more efficient
DC in terms of power consumption. Table I lists all of used
notations.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Given the defined system model, we can now describe our
problem through an example. Consider the smart grid system
in Figure 1 which represents the IEEE 24-bus reliability test
system, which includes 24 power buses and 38 branches.
Assume that there are N data centers in the system connected
to different buses. Each data center is in the domain of a
specific cloud provider, and obtains its power through the bus
is connected to. In this system, as stated before, the SG should
announce the price function for each power bus, according to
TABLE I: List of Notations.
Notation Definition
I Set of power buses
N Set of CPs
T Set of time slots
θTj Unit electricity price for DC j at time slot t
ztj Base electricity price at power bus j at time slot t
βj Sensitivity parameter at price function
δtj Billing reference at bus j at time slot t
Mj Number of hosts of DC j
W tj Workload of CP j at time slot t
Qj Processing capacity of DC j
rj Charging price for a VM of CP j
aj Number of VMs served by a single server
etj The amount of power consumption of DC j
P idlej Average idle power of a host at DC j
P peakj Average peak power of a host at DC j
mtj The number of active hosts of DC j at time slot t
γj Power usage efficiency (PUE) of DC j
U tj Average CPU utilization of servers at DC j
S A CP coalition/federation
v(S) Worth of coalition S
θS Electricity prices for CPs in coalition S
ψj(S) Payoff received by CP j as a member of S
R(S) Revenue rate of coalition S
C(S) Cost rate of coalition S
ωti,j Number of migrated VMs from CP i to j
CMi,j Cost of VM migration from CP i to j
USG The SG utility function
Gtj Maximum available power supply to DC j
θl Lower bound on the electricity price
θh Upper bound on the electricity price
α1, α2 Weighting parameters in the SG utility function
Ω State space of CPs coalition formation game
χ A coalition partition/state
BN N -th Bell Number
T (δ) Transition probability matrix of a coalition state
ηk,k′ (δ) Prob. of changing state from partition χk to χk′
σ Prob. of performing merge and split by a CP
τ(.) Best-reply rule function
% The probability of a CP acting rationally
 The probability of a CP acting irrationally−→p Stationary probabilities of Markov chain
pi The SG pricing policy
(1). In this regard, as βj and ztj parameters have known and
predictable values, the SG should determine the value of δtj .
The smart grid seeks to choose the set of prices to achieve its
predetermined goals which are maximizing the revenue and
minimizing the mismatch between the supply and demand.
Given electricity pricing functions, each CP should specify
the power demand of its data center, i.e. etj value in (1). Here,
CPs are flexible, rational customers who perform the demand
side management in such a way maximize their profits. The
profit defined as the total revenue obtained from serving the
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Fig. 1: An overview of the system model and problem state-
ment.
users’ requests, subtracted by the energy cost paid to the SG.
As shown in this figure, each data center j receives some
requests for workload processing from its users, denoted by
Wj . In a noncooperative case, each cloud provider should
process its own workload and, then, submits the power demand
to the smart grid in a way to ensure a service for all of its
workload. However, cloud providers can cooperate with each
other in the form of cloud federations and jointly process their
workload in such a way to reduce their electricity cost. For
example, consider a case with N CPs in which CPs 1, 4 and
5 form a coalition with three members, CPs 2 and 3 form a
coalition, CPs j and k form another coalition, and other CPs
prefer to work alone. In this case, the users’ requests received
by a coalition member can migrate to the other one, if this
migration leads to less cost than working non-cooperatively.
Within the aforementioned system, on the one hand, the
coalitions formed among CPs depend on the pricing functions
denoted by the SG. On the other hand, the electricity prices
as well as the profit earned by the SG influenced by the
coalition formation process performed by CPs. In other words,
the CPs form the coalitions in such a way minimize their
energy cost and changing the electricity price functions affect
on their cost. Hence, the SG can affect on the CPs’ decisions
and profits by controlling the pricing functions. Indeed, the
coalition formation among CPs changes their power demand
of different buses, consequently, has an undeniable influence
on the SG’s profit.
Given the above description, it is clear that the selected
strategy by each side (i.e., the SG and CPs) strongly affects
the behavior and subsequently, the profit of the other side.
Therefore, we are facing a strategic situation with rational
agents where the action taken by each decision-maker influ-
ences on the behavior and the payoff of the other. In such
setting, game theory is a proper analytical tool that can be
utilized to formulate the interactions between the SG and CPs
from one side and the cooperation among CPs from the other
side [13]. In the next section, we will describe a game model
that is designated to specify the optimal strategies should be
taken by decision makers.
V. GAME MODEL
In this section, we present our game model to jointly
address the coalition formation between the CPs and finding
the optimal pricing strategy of the SG. We need a hierarchical
model in which the SG sets the pricing functions at the first
and, then, the CPs respond to the SG action by forming
proper coalitions. In this regard, we designate a two-stage
game model, integrated with a coalition formation game in the
second stage, named ”Interactive Cooperative Game (ICG)”.
This model which is based on the controlled coalition game
introduced in [13], represented in Figure 2, and its details
will be explained in the following subsections. Particularly, in
this model, the SG as the leading player should specify the
pricing functions given the possible formed coalitions among
CPs, such that maximize its own profit. Furthermore, in the
second stage, the CPs as the followers manage their workload
collaboratively so that they minimize their cost.
To obtain the optimal strategies for the leader and followers,
our game is decomposed into the following two interrelated
problems: 1) An optimization formulation for the SG and 2)
Cooperative VM management by forming the CPs coalitions
in a distributed way. We start with the problem of cooperative
workload management by the CPs, and, then formulate the
optimization formulation for the SG.
A. CPs Coalitional Game
In this section, we study how CPs form stable coalitions,
optimally allocate the coalition workload and divide the coali-
tion profit. We apply the coalitional game theory to analyze
the cooperative behavior of CPs. Coalitional game is a branch
of game theory focused on studying the behavior of a group of
rational agents when they cooperate [37], [38]. In particular,
coalition formation game [37] is a special class of coalitional
games used for analyzing the coalition formation process
between the players. In our model, we should investigate the
cooperative workload management of CPs by forming the
federations and analyzing their characteristics. Hence, this type
of cooperative games is appropriate to use.
1) Coalitional Game Characterization: Given the set of
CPs as players of the coalition game, a coalition S ⊆ N is de-
fined as a non-empty subset of CPs who agree to cooperatively
serve their workload. We denote a coalition structure/partition
ofN by χ, where χ = {S1,S2, ...,Sl}. In our coalitional game
model, each provider is a member of exactly one coalition, i.e.,
Si ∩ Sj = ∅,∀i, j, where i 6= j and
⋃l
i=1 Si = N . The total
number of coalition structures is BN , where BN , the N -th
Bell number, is the number of nonempty subsets a set of size
N can be partitioned into [39].
In addition to the player set, each coalition S has a coalition
value, denoted by v(S). Mainly, the coalition value quantifies
the net profit of coalition S. In the following, we define the
coalition value for our coalition formation game.
2) Coalition Value: To determine the coalition value, we
should define the revenue and cost rate of a coalition S, which
are represented by R(S) and C(S), respectively. R(S) is the
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Stage 2: Cooperative VM management among CPs:
Information exchange: CPs exchange 
information about the electricity functions as 
well as the users’ workload.
Stage 1: Electricity price determination by the SG:
The process of determining the values of δ 𝑗s in the 
electricity price functions.
Price Announcement: The smart grid sets the 
value of δ 𝑗s and announces the price functions to 
the CPs.
Optimal policy determination: The SG solve the 
LP model equivalent of the MDP to find the 
optimal policy, which is a mapping from a 
coalitional partition to an action (δ).
Coalition formation: Using the coalition 
formation mechanism, CPs form some 
coalitions in such a way to maximize the 
coalition values.
VM allocation: Given the formed coalitions, 
the VMs migrated from the source CPs to the 
destination CPs in each coalition, which 
determines the total energy consumption of 
each CP j (𝑒𝑗
𝑡).
Payoff allocation: The total surplus earned by 
the CPs in each coalition will be distributed 
among the coalition members.
Calculating the required parameters: Given the 
received information from CPs, for each δ and for 
each CPs coalition partition, the SG calculates the 
SG utility (𝑈𝑆𝐺).
Electricity price 
functions
𝜃𝑗
𝑡 = 𝛽𝑗(𝑒𝑗
𝑡-𝛿𝑗
𝑡)+𝑍𝑗
𝑡
Electricity 
demand (𝑒𝑗
𝑡)
Fig. 2: Hierarchical two-stage game model. In the first stage, the SG chooses its strategy (the electricity price functions) so
that maximize its profit. In stage 2, the CPs adapt their strategies (i.e. coalition formation) to minimize their energy cost.
sum of revenue rates of individual VMs which served by the
coalition members, and can be calculated as:
R(S) =
∑
j∈S
W tj rj . (3)
The associated cost consists of the energy cost of processing
the coalition workload, which depends on the values of θtj , plus
the cost of the VM migration between the coalition members
(e.g., due to network bandwidth used for migration). This is
defined as:
C(S) =
∑
j∈S
θtj(δ)e
t
j(δ)−
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
ωti,jC
M
i,j , (4)
where CMi,j is the hourly migration cost of a VM from CP i
to CP j, and ωti,j represents the number of migrated VMs.
θtj is the electricity price at bus j, and obtained from (1).
etj is the amount of the power consumption of CP j, and
computed from 1. The VM migration will be performed when
the total energy cost of processing a VM in the destination
DC, plus the migration cost becomes less than the cost of
serving that VM in the source DC. This difference generally
stems from the location-dependent electricity prices. Given the
above explanation, we define the coalition value as follows:
v(S) = R(S)− C(S). (5)
As we can see from (3)-(5), the coalition value v(S) solely
depends on the members of S, with no dependency on the
other coalitions outside S . This property indicates the class
of cooperative games with characteristic form. So, our game
belongs to this class. Moreover, the proposed game has a
transferable utility (TU) because the coalition value in (5)
is the amount of money gained by this coalition and can be
divided among the members in any arbitrary manner [40].
We assume that all CPs apply the same policy to charge
their customers (same values for rj in (3)). So, the associated
cost of a coalition S , i.e., C(S) in (5), plays an important rule
in the coalition value. This cost depends on how the coalition
workload is assigned to the hosts of the coalition members.
As a result, different VM allocations change the values of etj
and ωti,j , subsequently, v(S). Moreover, as CPs are rational
players, they seek to minimize their cost as much as possible.
Therefore, we should find the optimal solution of the VM
allocation for a given coalition S, so as to minimize the total
cost. We cast this problem as a VM allocation optimization.
3) Optimal VM Allocation: As we mentioned, the VM
allocation should be done in such a way the cost becomes
minimized. Hence, we can formulate the optimal VM alloca-
tion as follows:
min
ωti,j
C(S) (6)
s.t.
∑
j∈S
ωti,j = Wi, ∀i ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T , (7)∑
i∈S
ωti,j ≤ Qj , ∀j ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T , (8)
ωti,j ∈ Z+, ∀i, j ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T , (9)
where ωti,j are decision variables, which are the number of
migrated VMs from DC i to j. The value of ωti,j affects on
the number of active hosts. (7) ensures that all workloads are
served. The condition presented by (8) guarantees that the total
workload assigned to a CP will not exceed its capacity. The
final constraint (9) defines the valid domain of the decision
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variables. By solving the optimization problem, the workload
should be migrated (ωti,j) and processed by each CP will be
specified. As a result, the amount of energy consumption of
each data center (etj) is determined.
4) Payoff Allocation: The final output of the optimization
problem in (4) is the optimal VM allocation among the
coalition members. In this stage, the coalition value, v(S),
can be calculated from (5), by substituting the coalition cost
from the revenue earned. Now, we should determine how
the total surplus should be distributed among the coalition
members. The payoff allocation rule specifies this allocation.
In this regard, we apply the Shapley value [41] to divide
the coalition payoff fairly. Here, fairness indicates that CP’s
profit is proportional to the value it is added to the federation.
In other words, the Shapley value represents the marginal
contributions of any CP to the federation it belongs to. In
contrast with other payoff sharing rules, this scheme allows
federations to allocate payoff to their members according to
their economical contributions. As the CPs seek to maximize
their monetary payoffs and cooperate with the others when
the cooperation leads to more benefit from acting alone, this
scheme is a good choice.
The Shapley value associates with every coalition a unique
payoff vector. This value for j ∈ S in a coalition formation
game with TU is calculated as follows:
ψj(S) =
∑
F⊆S{j}
|F|!(|S| − |F| − 1)!
|S|! (v(F ∪ j)− v(F)),
(10)
where F denotes all subsets of S that do not include j. In
other words, ψj(S) determines the final payoff that received
by cloud provider j, from the coalition S. It is clear from
Equations (4)- (10) that the electricity prices have a direct
effect on the profit earned by the CPs.
B. The Smart Grid Utility
Before introducing the interactive game model, we should
specify the SG’s utility function. We define the objective of
the SG as an optimal balance between maximizing its revenue
earned from selling the power and minimizing the mismatch
between the power supply and demand. In this regard, we
consider a utility function similar to [20] as follows:
USG(χk, δ) = α1
N∑
j=1
θtj(δ)e
t
j(δ)− α2K
N∑
j=1
|etj(δ)−Gtj |,
(11)
where χk is a partition of CPs, K is a normalized parameter,
and Gtj is the maximum available power supply to DC j at time
M, which is difference between the total power capacity at that
bus and the background load. The first term in (11), specifies
the total smart grid’s revenue from selling electricity to the
CPs, and the second part measures the amount of imbalance
between the power generation and load. In (11), α1 and α2 are
some wights, determined according to the importance of each
term, where α1 + α2 = 0, 0 ≤ α1, α2 ≤ 1 . It is clear from
(11) that the utility of SG changes by the electricity prices,
or the SG strategy ( δ) as well as the CPs’ power demand
(e). As we mentioned in Section V-A, the power demand of
CPs depend on the partition formed among them (χk). Hence,
each pair (χk, δ) leads to a specific profit for the SG.
The SG would like to directly control the CPs coalition
formation process and determine the final CPs’ partition in
a centralized manner, if the CPs fully cooperate with SG.
In this way, the SG operator selects the partition and price
set to maximize its payoff. Hence, we have the following
optimization problem in this scheme:
max
χk,δ
USG(χk, δ) (12)
s.t. θl ≤ θtj ≤ θh,∀j ∈ N , (13)
S ∩ S ′ = ∅,∀S,S ′ ∈ χk, (14)
∪∀S∈χk S = N . (15)
where χk and δ are decision variables. Constraint (15) deter-
mines the lower and upper bound on the electricity price.
In practice, this scheme is not appropriate for data centers,
given the risk of performance degradation [42]. Also, due
to selfishness, a CP accepts the grouping proposal of SG if
this partitioning maximizes its payoff. Otherwise, the CPs
deviate and prefer to form other coalitions to increase their
utilities. Hence, the CPs prefer to distributively decide about
the coalition formation in such a way to maximize their
utilities, which does not necessarily lead to maximum profit
for the SG. We will explain this process in the next section.
The centralized scheme, in which the CPs are not selfish, can
be used as a benchmark as it gives an upper bound on the
payoff that can be obtained by the smart grid.
C. Interactive Cooperative Game
In this section, we introduce the CPs’ coalition formation
mechanism and find stable coalitions. Then, formulate the
smart grid optimization in the interactive game model.
1) Coalition Formation Mechanism: Having defined the
characteristics of the CPs coalitional game as well as the
payoff sharing rule in Section V-A, we need to determine the
cooperative strategies of the CPs. These strategies specify how
the CPs can switch between the different coalitions. We define
two strategies for any CP in the coalitional game: 1) Split from
a coalition; 2) Merge into a coalition [13].
Consider a coalition S formed between some CPs. The CPs
decide to split from current coalition S and formed multiple
new coalitions S ′ , where S = ∪S ′ , if the payoff obtained by
all CPs in S ′ are larger or equal to their payoff in S, and at
least the profit of one CP strictly improves, as follows:
ψj(S) ≥ ψj(S ′),∀j ∈ S, and ∃k ∈ S, ψk(S) > ψk(S ′) (16)
On the other hand, the CPs who are in multiple coalitions
S decide to merge into a single new coalition S”, where S” =
∪S, if all CPs in all coalitions obtain larger or equal payoff
in this new coalition than the former coalitions, and the profit
of at least one CP strictly improves, i.e.
ψj(S”) ≥ ψj(S),∀j ∈ S, and ∃k ∈ S, ψk(S”) > ψk(S)
(17)
The time complexity of the coalition formation mechanism
is determined by the number of merge and split operations
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and the size of the sub-partitions. In the worst-case scenario,
each coalition needs to make a merge attempt with all the
other coalitions. In the initial coalition structure in which
each one of the N individual CPs is a federation, the first
merge needs N(N−1)2 attempts in the worst-case. The second
merge requires (N−1)(N−2)2 attempts and so on. As a result,
the total worst-case number of merge operations is in O(N3).
In the worst-case, splitting a federation S is in O(2|S|), which
involves finding all the possible partitions of size two of the
participating federations [43].
2) Stable Coalitions: After defining the cooperative strate-
gies of the CPs, now, we should analyze the dynamic of the
coalition formation process to find under what conditions it
settles down to the stable coalitional states. We apply a Markov
decision process (MDP) to obtain the solution.
Considering χk as a coalition structure, we define the state
space of the CPs coalition formation as follows:
Ω = {χk|k = {1, .., BN}}. (18)
The coalitional state will be changed if the strategies of
some CPs change due to their decision for merging into or
splitting from their current coalitions depend on the obtained
payoff from different coalitions. Given the electricity prices
announced by the smart grid, we denote the transition proba-
bility matrix for a coalitional state as follows:
T (δ) =

η1,1(δ) η1,k′ (δ) ... η1,BN (δ)
. . . .
. . . .
ηk,1(δ) ηk,k′ (δ) ... ηk,BN (δ)
. . . .
. . . .
ηBN ,1(δ) ηBN ,k′ (δ) ... ηBN ,BN (δ)

, (19)
where ηk,k′ (δ) is the probability that a coalitional state
changes from χk to χk′ . Suppose that kk,k′ ⊆ N is the set of
the CPs who decide to perform merge and split actions, which
results in a change in the coalition state from χk to χk′ , where
χk′ is reachable from χk, given the strategies of the CPs in
kk,k′ . Then, ηk,k′ (δ) can be given by [44], [45]:
ηk,k′ (δ) =
∏
i∈k
k,k
′
στi(χk′ |χk)(1− σ)N−|kk,k′ |, (20)
where σ denotes the probability of performing a merge and
split strategy by a CP. Note that if χk′ is not reachable from
χk, ηk,k′ (δ) will be equal to zero. τi(χk′ |χk) is a best-
reply rule and is defined as the probability of changing the
coalitional state from χk to χk′ due to the change in the
strategy of CP i. This probability can be calculated as follows:
τi(χk′ |χk) =
{
%, if ψi(S ∈ χk′ ) ≥ ψi(S ∈ χk),
, otherwise.
(21)
for i ∈ S ∈ χk, i ∈ S ∈ χk′ , and χk 6= χk′ . % ∈ (0, 1] is a
constant, and  is the probability that the CP acting irrationally
(e.g. due to the lack of information), leads to obtain less profit
and generally has a small value. The diagonal elements are
calculated as:
ηk,k(δ) = 1−
 ∑
χ
k
′∈Ω\{χk}
ηk,k′ (δ)
 . (22)
Given the fixed pricing parameter δ determined by the SG,
we should derive the stationary probability of the Markov
chain defined by the state space in (18) and the transition
probability in (19). We denote the vector of the stationary
probabilities by −→p δ = [pδ(χ1), ..., pδ(χk), ..., pδ(χBN )]T . It
can be obtained by solving the following set of equations:−→p Tδ = −→p Tδ T (δ), and −→p Tδ
−→
1 = 1. If the probability of taking
the irrational decision approaches zero (i.e.,  −→ 0+), there
could be an ergodic set Ec ⊆ Ω of states χk. Once all players
enter a coalitional state in an ergodic set, they will remain in
that set forever after. Ergodic set defines as follows.
Definition 1. A set Ec is ergodic if ηk,k′ (δ) = 0, for any χk ∈
Ec and χk′ /∈ Ec, and no nonempty proper subset of Ec has
this property. The singleton ergodic sets are named absorbing
states. In other words,χk is absorbing set, if ηk,k(δ) = 1 [44].
The absorbing states are stable coalitional states. Reaching
to an absorbing state, which is a stable coalitional state, no
player has an incentive to change its strategy, given the pre-
vailing coalitional state. As a result, by finding the stationary
probability of the Markov chain, we can derive the stable
coalition states.
3) Optimization Formulation for the Smart Grid: For
any given coalitional structure, the smart grid must de-
cide on its optimal pricing parameters’ vector δ. Hence,
given the underlying coalitional game between the CPs, the
optimization formulation for the smart grid, is a 4-tuple
(Ω,Ξ, ηk,k′ (δ), U
SG(χk, δ)), where Ω is a finite set of coali-
tional states as defined in (18), Ξ is a finite set of actions
δ, ηk,k′ (δ) is the transition probability defined in (20), and
USG(χk, δ) is the immediate profit (utility) the SG obtained
at coalitional structures χk with action δ defined in (11).
The SG aims at optimizing its long-term profit through
choosing the optimal policy. A policy is a mapping from a
coalitional state χk ∈ Ω to an action δ ∈ Ξ. The SG should
determine its action in such a way satisfies the constraint on the
electricity price in (15). Therefore, the optimization problem
for the smart grid can be formulated as:
max
pi
ΥU,pi (23)
s.t. θl ≤ Υθ,pi ≤ θh,∀j ∈ N , (24)
where:
ΥU,pi = lim
T−→∞
inf
1
T
T∑
t=1
Epi[U
SG(δ(t), χk(t))], (25)
Υθ,pi = lim
T−→∞
sup
1
T
T∑
t=1
Epi[θi(δ(t), χk(t))], (26)
where χk(t) and δ(t) are the coalition structure and the vector
of the pricing parameters at time t, respectively. Epi(.) denotes
the expectation over policy pi. Policy pi is defined as pi =
{ϕ(χk, δ)|k = {1, ..., BN},∀δ ∈ Ξ}, where ϕ(χk, δ) is the
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probability of taking action δ at coalitional state χk.
To obtain the optimal policy of MDP as defined in (23)-
(24), an equivalent linear programming (LP) model can be
formulated. We use this equivalent model to find φ(χk, δ),
which is the stationary probability of the coalitional state and
action. The LP model is defined as follows:
max
φ(χk,δ)
∑
χk∈Ω
(∑
δ∈Ξ
USG(χk, δ)φ(χk, δ)
)
(27)
s.t.
θl ≤
∑
χk∈Ω
(∑
δ∈Ξ
θi(χk, δ)φ(χk, δ)
)
≤ θh,∀i ∈ N , (28)
∑
δ∈Ξ
φ(χk′ , δ) =
∑
χk∈Ω
(∑
δ∈Ξ
φ(χk, δ)ηk,k′ (δ)
)
, (29)
∑
χk∈Ω
(∑
δ∈Ξ
φ(χk, δ)
)
= 1, (30)
φ(χk, δ) ≥ 0,∀χk ∈ Ω, ∀δ ∈ Ξ, (31)
for χk′ ∈ Ω.
Given the optimal solution φ∗(χk, δ) of the LP model, we
can calculate the probability that the smart grid selects δ when
the coalitional state of CPs is χk. We denote this probability
by ϕ∗(χk, δ), and calculate as follows:
ϕ∗(χk, δ) =
φ∗(χk, δ)∑
δ
′∈Ξ φ
∗(χk, δ
′
)
, (32)
for
∑
δ
′∈Ξ φ
∗(χk, δ
′
) > 0. Given the values of ϕ∗(χk, δ),
the optimal policy is then defined as pi∗ = {ϕ∗(χk, δ)|k =
{1, ..., BN},∀δ ∈ Ξ}
As we mentioned in section V-C2, depending on the optimal
policy of the smart grid, the stationary probability of the
coalitional state can be derived. For an optimal policy pi∗,
we denote the stationary probability of coalitional state χk by
pi∗(χk). The vector of the stationary probabilities is denoted by−→p pi∗ = [p∗pi(χ1), ..., p∗pi(χk), ..., p∗pi(χBN )]T , and can be com-
puted by solving the following equations: −→p Tpi∗ = −→p Tpi∗T pi∗ ,
and −→p pi∗−→1 = 1. In this regard, we compute the average profit
of the smart grid as:
USG =
∑
χk∈Ω
p∗pi(χk)
(∑
δ∈Ξ
ϕ∗(χk, δ)USG(χk, δ)
)
, (33)
and, the average cost of content provider i is obtained from:
ψi =
∑
χk∈Ω
p∗pi(χk)
(∑
δ∈Ξ
ϕ∗(χk, δ)ψi(χk, δ)
)
. (34)
Again, if the probability of irrational decision approaches
zero, there could be an ergodic set Ec ⊆ Ω of absorbing states.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Parameter Setting
We consider six DCs, which are operated by independent
CPs, that are geographically located in different regions in
the United States [14]. The configuration parameters of DCs
TABLE II: Simulation parameters [7].
DC# M a PUE P idle(KW ) P peak (KW )
1 15000 1 1.3 0.086 0.274
2 12000 2 1.5 0.143 0.518
3 10000 3 1.3 0.490 1.117
4 20000 1 1.6 0.086 0.274
5 15000 2 1.8 0.143 0.518
6 10000 3 1.1 0.490 1.117
include the number of hosts (M ) and the value of parameter
a, the idle and peak power of the hosts, as well as PUE (γ)
of each DC are reported in Table II. Although the value of
PUEs in our model can be constant or variable, here, for
simplicity we assume constant PUE values for DCs under all
loads. However, in practice, it varies with the IT load and
environmental conditions and improved at lower loads. As a
result, when some workloads migrated from a DC connected
to a bus with a high electricity price to the other one with a
lower price, we could gain more than we are currently earning
by assuming the constant PUEs.
The cost of a VM migration from CP i to CP j is calculated
as the product of the cost rate of transferring data, data rate,
and the time of migration. Data cost rate is set to 0.001 $/GB
according to the Amazon EC2 data transfer pricing [46], and
we assume that data would be sent at a fixed rate of 100
Mbit/s. Migration time is a random number from the Normal
distribution with mean 554 sec. and the standard deviation of
364 sec. [7].
The dynamic computing requests are simulated using the
one-day HP request trace reported in [14]. It is scaled pro-
portionally to the total capacity of data centers. Then, the
workload of each hour randomly is distributed among data
centers based on their capacity. We took hourly demands of
six locations on 27th August 2018 as the background power
load for calculating Gis in (11) [47]–[49]. The lower and
upper boundaries of electricity prices are set to be 8 and 25
cents/kWh based on the data from [50]. The parameters of the
interactive coalitional game are σ = 0.5, % = 0.99,  = 0.01,
α1 = 0.3, and α2 = 0.7 [13]. We use MATLAB for simulation
and YALMIP toolbox [51] along with CPLEX [52] solver for
solving the optimization problems.
B. Simulation Results and Evaluation
In addition to the proposed interactive cooperative game
model (ICG), we also simulate two other approaches: a
centralized approach introduced in Section V-B (we call it
CENT), and a noncooperative scheme (we named it NoCoop).
In the CENT approach, we assume that the smart grid de-
cides about the CPs coalition partition, the CPs are not selfish,
and they follow the SG suggestion to form their coalitions.
In NoCoop, the cloud providers individually process their
workload without forming any coalition. Hence, regardless of
the selected strategy by the SG (δ in the pricing function),
CPs have the specific power demand. Therefore, the value
of ejs will be fixed. Consequently, the second term in (11),
has a specific fixed value. But, depending on the smart grid
strategy, the unit electricity price will be changed, resulting in
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Fig. 4: Profit improvement of SG in the scheduling period.
different values for the first term in (11). Since the SG is a
rational player, chooses the minimum value for δ to maximize
the electricity price, consequently, its profit. Therefore, in the
simulation of the noncooperative scheme, we report the results
for the strategy with the maximum SG’s profit.
In what follows, we evaluate the effectiveness of our model
in terms of average profits obtained by the SG operator as well
as by the cloud providers.
1) SG Profit: Figure 3 shows the resulting SG profit during
the scheduling period. We also show the profit improvement
of ICG and CENT compared to the NoCoop scheme, as well
as the profit improvement percentage earned through CENT
in comparison to ICG in Figure 4.
As can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, the two cooperative
approaches (i.e., ICG and CENT) improve substantially the
total SG’ profit compared to noncooperative scheme, which
demonstrates the positive effect of CPs cooperation on the
SG profit when the SG chooses its strategy by considering
this cooperation. Based on these figures, the average one-
day’s profit of the SG in CENT, ICG and NoCoop is equal
to about 125560, 11930, and 9456, respectively. Indeed, the
average profit improvement in CENT and ICG compared to
the NoCoop case is 38 and 28% on average, respectively. As
we mentioned in Section V-B, CENT approach as a benchmark
gives an upper bound on the profit can be earned by SG
through the CPs cooperation, and Figure 4 shows that this
bound is not much larger than the value obtained by ICG
approach (8% on average). Nonetheless, the SG operator can
design mechanisms to encourage CPs to follow its suggestion
to achieve the maximum payoff.
2) CPs Profit: Figure 5 shows the aggregated profit earned
by the CPs during different hours, and Figure 6 presents the
average profit and the profit improvement for different CPs
in ICG and CENT compared to NoCoop, as well as the
profit improvement of ICG vs. CENT approach. From these
figures, we observe that cooperative participation of CPs in
demand response programs yields more profit compared to
the noncooperative scheme. This improvement is 29%, and
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19% for ICG and CENT, on average. Nonetheless, the profit
improvement of CPs are not the same, and they earn different
profits depending on their configurations and contributions.
However, the aggregated profit of ICG is larger than the
CENT approach during most hours, the difference in the
average profit is insignificant (The ICG on average leads to
10% more benefit than the CENT model). But, as the CPs are
rational, selfish entities, they prefer to distributively decide
on the cooperation process to achieve the maximum payoff,
unless the SG applies the other mechanism to mitigate this
difference. In summary and based on the simulation results, it
is clear that CPs can maximize their payoffs in DR programs
by cooperative workload management, and the SG can also
gain from this cooperation by right setting its strategy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on the interaction of the
smart grid, and multiple cooperative cloud providers in the
context of a dynamic electricity pricing scheme. We aimed
to formulate the process of dynamic electricity pricing by
the SG along with the cooperative workload management of
independent CPs to analyze the impact of decisions taken by
each side on the other. We have modeled this scenario as
a two-stage Stackelberg game interleaved with a coalitional
game, we named interactive cooperative game (ICG). In this
game, the SG as the leader specifies the pricing functions, and
the CPs as followers manage their workload collaboratively so
that minimize their cost. We have applied a coalitional game
formulation for analyzing the cooperation process among CPs,
and an optimization model based on the constrained Markov
decision process for finding the optimal policy by the SG.
We have performed thorough simulations to evaluate the
proposed scheme. Simulation results showed that ICG sig-
nificantly improves the profit of SG as well as the CPs
compared to the noncooperative case. The values of SG’s
utility improvement for ICG approach is 28%, on average,
compared to the noncooperative scheme. The CPs profits are
also increased by 29%, on average, in ICG scheme.
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TABLE III: Summery of related works on DCs participating in DR programs.
Topic DR Scenario DC Operator Objective SG Objective ProblemFormulation Other Features Ref.
Service request routing in CC jointly
with power flow analysis in SG
Regulated and
deregulated market NA
Load balancing and
robustness
Optimization NA [53]
Find best location for building a DC Regulated andderegulated market
Minimizing 1. carbon
footprint, 2. energy &
bandwidth & carbon tax
cost, 2. average service
latency
NA MILP NA [54]
Minimizing the total electricity cost
of IDCs while guaranteeing QoS
Multi-electricity-
market
Minimizing total
electricity cost NA Constrained MILP
Consider delay and workload
constraints
[55],
[56]
Model the market power of IDC and
formulate electricity cost
minimization
NA Minimizing electricitycost NA MILNP
Consider DCs as price makers, and
take into account delay and
workload constraints
[57],
[58]
Minimize the IDC operation risk Electricity spot
markets
Minimizing operation
risk NA
Bilevel
programming
Consider correlation between
workload and spot electricity price
[59],
[60]
Adjust DCs load to balance the
unstable solar input NA NA
Minimizing power
loss
Genetic algorithm
Analyzed the impact of flexibility
and delay of DC actions & Predict
renewable generation in [61]
[61],
[62]
Dynamic load distribution and
migration policies Peak Power
Minimizing electricity
cost NA NA
Consider transient cooling effect [63]
Minimize electricity cost under
diverse delay requirements
Multi-electricity-
market
Minimizing energy cost NA CMIP NA [64]
GLB scheme for distributed
price-maker IDCs
Deregulated power
market
Minimizing energy
cost+revenue loss of
degraded service
performance
NA Optimization
Consider impact of GLB upon
electricity prices [16]
Joint inter- and intra-data center
workload management NA Minimizing energy cost NA
Constrained
nonlinear
optimization
NA [65]
Dynamic pricing negotiation Dynamic pricing Minimizing energy cost NA Optimization NA [66]
Minimize energy cost of DCs Tiered pricing Minimizing energy cost NA
Convex
optimization
DCs powered by power grid and
local renewable energy generations [34]
Optimize self-power consumption of
a distributed cloud with on-site
renewable generation
NA Minimizing energy cost NA NA Virtually exchange renewable energybetween DCs [67]
Minimize the operational cost of
cloud for fair request allocations
Deregulated market Minimizing theoperational cost NA Optimization
Propose a fast approximation
algorithm for solving the problem [68]
Cost-efficient workload scheduling NA
Reducing the penalties
cost of scheduling
scheme
Smooth the load
variation
Multi-objective
optimization
Consider batch and interactive
workloads
[69],
[70]
Optimal coordinated operation
framework for minimizing the
overall electricity cost
Day-ahead and
real-time wholesale
market
Minimizing the overall
electricity cost NA NA
Consider cost of purchasing power
from main grid, operation cost of
onsite generations, carbon emission
cost, & consider batch and
interactive workloads
[71]
Greening scheduling of cloud DCs
in an economical way NA
Minimizing 1.energy
cost, 2. carbon emission NA Complex MILP
Consider fluctuates in power prices,
energy supply, and dynamics of
request
[17]
Manage the uncertainties in IDC
operations under SG environment
Forward and spot
market
Minimizing weighted
sum of operation risk and
expected energy cost
NA
Two-stage
stochastic
programming
Consider Self-generation DCs [72]
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TABLE III: Summery of related works on DCs participating in DR programs (Cont.)
Topic DR Scenario Objectives of CPs Objectives of SG ProblemFormulation Other Features Ref.
Electricity bill capping Locational pricing
Minimizes the electricity
cost, maximize
throughput within cost
budget
NA MILP
• Consider the energy
consumption of cooling and
network equipment
• Consider the DCs as price
maker
[73]
DCs coupled decisions of choosing
utility companies and scheduling
workload
Real-time pricing Minimizing the energy
and risk cost
Maximizing power
selling revenue and
minimizing
peak-to-average ratio
Matching game
with externalities
Consider uncertainty in the
renewable generation and workloads
arrival
[74]
Study interactions between SG and
DCs by considering the active
decisions on both sides
Regional dynamic
pricing Minimizing energy cost Power load balancing
Two-stage
problem/ bilevel
optimization
• Consider the effect of load
distribution on the SG
• Study the impact of
background load prediction
error [75]
[75],
[76]
Model interaction between SG, and
cloud computing
Two
location-dependent
dynamic pricing
Maximizing profit
Maximizing profit
and performing load
balancing
Two-stage
sequential game
Consider power flow analysis, and
distributed renewable generation in
the SG [33]
[33],
[77]
Model interactions among SG, cloud
computing, and other load devices
Location-dependent
real-time pricing Maximizing profit
Maximizing profit
and performing load
balancing
Two stage
Stackelberg
game+non-
cooperative
game
NA [78]
Study DR of geo-distributed DCs
using electricity pricing signals Real-time pricing Cost minimization Profit maximization
Two-stage
Stackelberg
+non-cooperative
game
• Utilize workload shifting and
dynamic server allocation
• Consider dependency between
utilities
[79],
[80]
Study bilateral electricity trade
between SGs and DCs with hybrid
green sources
Real-time pricing Cost minimization Profit maximization
Stackelberg
game+non-
cooperative
game
DCs participate in net metering
program to sold excess renewable
energy to SGs
[19],
[81]
Energy-aware resource allocation by
using of renewable energy sources NA
Sustain the energy of
DCs using renewable
energy sources (RES)
Profit maximization
Stackelberg games
Consider users’
SLA and QoS
[82]
Online cost minimization of
distributed DCs and EVs of their
employees
NA
Cost minimization
problem of DCs and EVs
of their employees
NA
Stochastic
programming/
Lyapunov
optimization
• Consider uncertainties in DC
workloads, electricity prices,
and EV energy demands
• Consider EV charging delays
and peak power limits
[83]
Risk-aware optimization framework
allows DCs to operate as
controllable load resources
Real-time and
emergency DR in
wholesale market
NA Profit maximization Optimization
Consider uncertainties in workload
migration time, and obtained payoff
from DR
[84]
Efficient incentive mechanism to
elicit DR from geo-distributed
clouds
incentive DR/ bidding
Social welfare
maximization (the
aggregated utility of the
cloud and SGs
Social welfare
maximization
Auction
mechanism
Strike a balance among the
economic efficiency, truthfulness
and the computational efficiency
[15],
[85]
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TABLE III: Summery of related works on DCs participating in DR programs (Cont.)
Topic DR Scenario Objectives of CPs Objectives of SG ProblemFormulation Other Features Ref.
DC cost reduction by exploiting the
diversity in the electricity price in
multiple market
Bidding in day-ahead
and real-time market Profit maximization NA
Stochastic
optimization
Consider users SLA, risk, and
statistical characteristics of workload
and electricity prices
[86]
Cost reduction via jointly optimizing
electricity procurement and GLB
Bidding in real-time
and day-ahead
markets
Minimizing total
electricity and bandwidth
cost
NA Auction
Consider a distribution for
electricity price and workload arrival [87]
Study interactions of GLB and
electricity supply chains
Bidding in day-ahead
wholesale market
Minimizing energy and
GLB cost NA Auction NA [88]
Optimal trading in the forward
electricity market Forward market
Minimizing cost of
electricity, switching,
response time, network
delay, carbon emission
NA
Convex
optimization
Consider electricity price variation,
renewable availability, cooling
conditions, the effect of carbon
emission and server switching
[89]
Optimal DR capabilities of IDCs
considering uncertainty in workload
arrival
Day-ahead market Minimizing expectedelectricity bill NA
MILP-based
stochastic
optimization
Consider cost of electricity
consumption, emission, migration,
and revenue from DR provision
[90]
Study Emergency DR of colocations
by delaying the tenants batch
workload and diesel usage
Emergency DR
Minimizing cost of
tenants performance and
operators diesel generator
NA Auction
Present an online algorithm by
considering users’ QoS in [91]
[91],
[92]
Balance excess renewable energy in
colocation DCs
Discounted energy
prices in form of
energy credits
Maximizing profit of
cloud broker NA
Optimization NA [93]
Enable reliable DR through DR
capacity aggregation
Capacity bidding
program
Maximizing the expected
profit NA Coalitional game
Consider uncertainty in DR
capacities [94]
Energy cost reduction via
aggregately bidding
Bidding in day-ahead
forward market
Minimizing the
electricity bill NA Coalitional game
Consider uncertainty in DCs’ power
demand [31]
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TABLE IV: Summery of related works on energy management of cloud federations.
Topic Objectives of CPs Problem Formulation Other Features Ref.
Energy-aware (re)allocation of VMs Minimizing energy consumption or
carbon emission
Constraint Programming Consider the cloud users’ SLA, and DC
features
[95]
Reducing the carbon dioxide emissions in federated
cloud ecosystems Reducing carbon emission NA NA [96]
Load balancing among federated micro-datacenters
powered by renewable energies
Minimizing non-renewable energy cost Markov Chain/ Mean FieldAnalysis NA [97]
Distributed approach for federation formation Maximizing individual profit of clouds Cooperative game theory NA [98]
Energy-aware resource and revenue sharing
mechanism for cloud federations
Maximizing social welfare of CPs Coalition game theory Consider demand variations of internal
users
[99]
Energy-aware scheduling policy for commercial and
academic cloud federations
Minimizes the energy consumption of a
federation while maintaining its
performance
NA NA [100]
VM allocation, cost management, and cooperation
formation
Minimize the expected cumulative cost
of all cooperative clouds
Coalitional game/ Network
formation game/ Stochastic
programming
Consider uncertainties of users demand,
power price, and renewable power source [28]
DC energy flexibility exploitation for smart grid
integration & business scenarios for participating
DC federations in DR
Adapt the DCs energy demand to
improve the SG’s stability MINLP
Consider electrical and thermal energy,
and workload relocation flexibility [101]
